President Trump’s remarks in recent weeks —1
contending that fellow NATO members “owe [the United
States] a tremendous amount of money,” labeling the European
Union a trade “foe” and calling Russian President Vladimir4
Putin “a good competitor,” for example — have heightened the
anxiety of observers who question the resilience of the postwar
order. Some focus on the challenges posed by external actors7
— whether the selective revisionism of China as a complex
competitor-cum-partner or the more confrontational behavior
of Russia, which appears to have calculated that it can obtain10
more short-term influence by destabilizing the system than by
integrating into it.
Others are more concerned with internal stresses.13
Trump’s “America First” approach to foreign policy — which
has surfaced and amplified simmering economic and
demographic anxieties among a significant segment of the16
American public — articulates a sharp critique of the order’s
alleged strategic benefits to the United States, its leading
architect. Across the pond, meanwhile, increasingly powerful19
populist forces from a broad ideological spectrum are
contesting the legitimacy of the European project.
While these various accounts go a long way in22
explaining the postwar order’s woes, they discount an
important explanation: having thus far succeeded in achieving
its foundational goal — averting a third world war — the25
postwar order lacks imperatives of comparable urgency to
impel its modernization.
It is misleading to characterize the postwar era as a28
“long peace.” Proxy wars, civil wars and genocides have killed
tens of millions over the past three-quarters of a century. Nor
do observers agree why a war between great powers has not31
occurred during that time: they have offered explanations as
diverse as “war aversion”, nuclear weapons, the U.S. alliance
system and Enlightenment values.34
Still, the headline accomplishment remains: no global
conflagration has occurred under the aegis of the postwar
order. However, this is not to suggest that the system is37
performing well; to the contrary, its limitations are widely
understood and increasingly apparent. It is insufficiently
responsive to and reflective of the evolving balance of power,40
which continues to shift eastward.
The modernization of the world order would ideally
result from farsighted diplomacy. It is more likely, though, that43
policymakers will do little more than push for incremental
improvements to an inadequate system, thereby enabling the
aforementioned forces —ranging from external challenges to46
populist uprisings — to continue testing its foundations. The
potential result of indefinite erosion — a vacuum in order,
without a coherent alternative to replace it — is unpalatable. In49
a nuclear age, though, it is terrifying to consider what might
have to occur for a new order to emerge.
Ali Wyne. A new world order will likely arise only from
calamity. The Washington Post, jul./2018 (adapted).